| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15695 |
| DP15695 An Experiment in Candidate Selection | |
| Katherine Casey; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccolo Meriggi | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits—like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination—at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Political selection Information provision Primaries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15695 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544702 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Katherine Casey,Abou Bakarr Kamara,Niccolo Meriggi. DP15695 An Experiment in Candidate Selection. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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