| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15696 |
| DP15696 'Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families | |
| Rossella Calvi; Ajinkya Keskar | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a non-cooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian anti-dowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women's decision-making power and separations, and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters’ human capital to compensate for lower dowries. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Domestic violence Dowry Non-cooperative bargaining India Marital surplus Women's empowerment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15696 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544703 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rossella Calvi,Ajinkya Keskar. DP15696 'Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families. 2021. |
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