| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15703 |
| DP15703 Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods | |
| John Asker; Mariagiovanna Baccara; SangMok Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods. This affects the way coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions per se can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. We show that limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Intellectual property Asymmetric auctions Club goods Patents |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15703 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544710 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Asker,Mariagiovanna Baccara,SangMok Lee. DP15703 Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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