| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15709 |
| DP15709 Information Design by an Informed Designer | |
| Frédéric Koessler; Vasiliki Skreta | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define an intuitive class of incentive compatible information disclosure mechanisms which we coin interim optimal mechanisms. We prove that an interim optimal mechanism exists, and that it is an equilibrium outcome of the interim information design game. An ex-ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is whenever it is ex-post optimal. In addition, in leading settings in which action sets are binary, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We relate interim optimal mechanisms to other solutions of informed principal problems. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Interim information design Bayesian persuasion Informed principal Neutral optimum Strong-neologism proofness Core mechanism Verifiable types |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15709 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544716 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frédéric Koessler,Vasiliki Skreta. DP15709 Information Design by an Informed Designer. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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