| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15711 |
| DP15711 Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis | |
| Antonio Cabrales; Francesco Feri; Piero Gottardi; Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and receivers’ interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Experiments Cheap talk Deception Conflicts of interest Social preferences |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15711 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544718 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio Cabrales,Francesco Feri,Piero Gottardi,et al. DP15711 Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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