| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15714 |
| DP15714 When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia | |
| Erika Deserranno; Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect of raising the level and the transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives instead have no effect on take-up, despite greater agent effort. This is explained by the financial incentives conveying a negative signal about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product and its providers to potential clients. In contexts with limited information about a new technology, financial incentives can thus affect technology adoption through both a supply-side effect (more agent effort) as well as a demand-side signaling effect (change in demand perceptions). Organizations designing incentive schemes should therefore pay close attention to both the level and the transparency of such incentives. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial incentives Pay transparency Technology adoption |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15714 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544720 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erika Deserranno,Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta. DP15714 When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
