G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15714
DP15714 When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia
Erika Deserranno; Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta
发表日期2021-01-25
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study the effect of raising the level and the transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives instead have no effect on take-up, despite greater agent effort. This is explained by the financial incentives conveying a negative signal about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product and its providers to potential clients. In contexts with limited information about a new technology, financial incentives can thus affect technology adoption through both a supply-side effect (more agent effort) as well as a demand-side signaling effect (change in demand perceptions). Organizations designing incentive schemes should therefore pay close attention to both the level and the transparency of such incentives.
主题Development Economics
关键词Financial incentives Pay transparency Technology adoption
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15714
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544720
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Erika Deserranno,Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta. DP15714 When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia. 2021.
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