| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15718 |
| DP15718 The voting premium | |
| Doron Levit; Nadya Malenko; Ernst Maug | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. A blockholder and dispersed shareholders first trade in a competitive market and then vote at a shareholder meeting. A positive voting premium emerges only if the blockholder is not the median voter, since he is then willing to pay a higher price to move the median voter in his preferred direction. Hence, the voting premium does not emerge from exercising control, but from influencing who exercises control. Empirical measures of the voting premium generally do not reflect the economic value of voting rights to the blockholder, and the voting premium is unrelated to measures of voting power, such as the probability of being pivotal. A negative voting premium can emerge in situations when dispersed shareholders could free-ride on the blockholder's trades. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Voting Trading Voting premium Blockholders Ownership structure Shareholder rights Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15718-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544724 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Doron Levit,Nadya Malenko,Ernst Maug. DP15718 The voting premium. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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