| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15721 |
| DP15721 Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: A mechanism design approach | |
| Laurence Jacquet; Etienne LEHMANN | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-26 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a new method, that we call an allocation perturbation, to derive the optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with multidimensional individual characteristics on which taxes cannot be conditioned. It is well established that, when individuals differ in terms of preferences on top of their skills, optimal marginal tax rates can be negative. In contrast, we show that with heterogeneous behavioral responses and skills, one has optimal positive marginal tax rates, under utilitarian preferences and maximin. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Optimal taxation Mechanism design Multidimensional screening problems Allocation perturbation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15721 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544727 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurence Jacquet,Etienne LEHMANN. DP15721 Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: A mechanism design approach. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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