| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15723 |
| DP15723 Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents | |
| Jesper Armouti-Hansen; Lea Cassar; Anna Dereky | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-26 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many jobs are connected to a prosocial mission, i.e., they have a positive impact on society beyond profit-maximization. This paper reveals a new hidden benefit of the mission: its role in facilitating the emergence of efficiency wages. We show that in a standard gift exchange, principals highly underestimate agents’ reciprocity and thereby offer wages that are much lower than the profit-maximizing level. However, the presence of a social mission (in the form of a positive externality generated by the agent’s effort), by increasing principals’ trust in the agents’ effort responses, acts as a debiasing mechanism and thereby increases efficiency substantially |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Mission motivation Gift exchange Biased beliefs Efficiency wages |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15723-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544729 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jesper Armouti-Hansen,Lea Cassar,Anna Dereky. DP15723 Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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