| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15732 |
| DP15732 Collective Brand Reputation | |
| Volker Nocke; Roland Strausz | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-28 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as a pooling of quality signals generated in different markets. Such pooling yields a beneficial informativeness effect for the actions of a global player present in all markets, but also harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing, applying to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collective branding Reputation Free riding Repeated games Imperfect monitoring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15732 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544737 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Volker Nocke,Roland Strausz. DP15732 Collective Brand Reputation. 2021. |
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