| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15737 |
| DP15737 Who Lends Before Banking Crises? Evidence from the International Syndicated Loan Market | |
| Mariassunta Giannetti; Yeejin Jang | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that foreign lenders and low market share lenders extend more credit in comparison to other lenders during lending booms leading to banking crises, but not during other credit expansions. Less established lenders also increase the amount of credit they extend to riskier borrowers, without asking for collateral or imposing covenants and higher interest rates. Our results suggest that taking lenders’ characteristics into account could provide an indicator for how much risk an economy is accumulating and be a useful barometer for macroprudential policies. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Foreign banks Crises Credit booms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15737 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544740 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mariassunta Giannetti,Yeejin Jang. DP15737 Who Lends Before Banking Crises? Evidence from the International Syndicated Loan Market. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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