| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15751 |
| DP15751 Financing Skilled Labor | |
| Vladimir Vladimirov | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How does competition for high-skilled workers affect the design and financing of compensation? The paper shows that competition affects compensation structure by leading to more equity-based pay. Such compensation attracts workers by helping them extract higher expected pay when uncertain about firm value. Equity-based compensation reduces firms' need for external financing, but it increases retention risk. Specifically, by making workers dependent on the retention of other workers, equity-based compensation increases the risk that worker turnover becomes contagious. To lower their compensation costs and improve retention, firms with stronger bargaining power favor deferred fixed compensation backed by credit lines. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financing wages Compensation structure of non-executive employees High-skilled employees Contagious turnover Worker runs Worker bargaining power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15751 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544753 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vladimir Vladimirov. DP15751 Financing Skilled Labor. 2021. |
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