G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15755
DP15755 How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
Pierre Chaigneau; Alex Edmans; Daniel Gottlieb
发表日期2021-02-01
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要The informativeness principle demonstrates that a contract should depend on informative signals. This paper studies how it should do so. Signals that indicate the output distribution has shifted to the left (e.g. weak industry performance) reduce the threshold for the manager to be paid; those that indicate output is a precise measure of effort (e.g. low volatility) decrease high thresholds and increase low thresholds. Surprisingly, "good" signals of performance need not reduce the threshold. Applying our model to performance-based vesting, we show that performance measures should affect the strike price rather than the number of vesting options, contrary to practice.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Informativeness principle Limited liability Option repricing Pay-for-luck Performance-based vesting Performance-sensitive debt
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15755
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544757
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Pierre Chaigneau,Alex Edmans,Daniel Gottlieb. DP15755 How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?. 2021.
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