| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15755 |
| DP15755 How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? | |
| Pierre Chaigneau; Alex Edmans; Daniel Gottlieb | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The informativeness principle demonstrates that a contract should depend on informative signals. This paper studies how it should do so. Signals that indicate the output distribution has shifted to the left (e.g. weak industry performance) reduce the threshold for the manager to be paid; those that indicate output is a precise measure of effort (e.g. low volatility) decrease high thresholds and increase low thresholds. Surprisingly, "good" signals of performance need not reduce the threshold. Applying our model to performance-based vesting, we show that performance measures should affect the strike price rather than the number of vesting options, contrary to practice. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Informativeness principle Limited liability Option repricing Pay-for-luck Performance-based vesting Performance-sensitive debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15755 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544757 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Chaigneau,Alex Edmans,Daniel Gottlieb. DP15755 How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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