| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15757 |
| DP15757 Financial Fragility with Collateral Circulation | |
| Piero Gottardi; Vincent Maurin; Cyril Monnet | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of secured credit chains in which the circulation of risky collateral generates fragility. An intermediary stands between a borrower and a financier. The intermediary borrows to finance her own investment opportunity, subject to a moral hazard problem, and in addition, can intermediate funds. She will only do so if she can repledge to the financier the collateral pledged by the borrower. We show that when the repledged collateral is sufficiently risky and the loan that it secures is recourse, the circulation of collateral generates fragility in the chain, by undermining the intermediary's incentives. The arrival of news about the value of the repledged collateral further increases fragility. This fragility channel of collateral re-use generates a premium for safe or opaque collateral. The environment considered in our model applies to various situations, such as trade credit chains, securitization and repo markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Macroeconomics and Growth |
| 关键词 | Collateral Credit chains Secured lending Intermediation Fragility |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15757 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544759 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Piero Gottardi,Vincent Maurin,Cyril Monnet. DP15757 Financial Fragility with Collateral Circulation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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