| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15764 |
| DP15764 Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital? | |
| Reint Gropp; Thomas Mosk; Steven Ongena; Ines Simac; Carlo Wix | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how higher capital requirements introduced at the supranational and implemented at the national level affect the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that affected banks inflate their levels of regulatory capital without a commensurate increase in their book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. This observed regulatory capital inflation is more pronounced in countries where credit supply is expected to tighten. Our results suggest that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Capital requirements Eba capital exercise National forbearance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15764 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Reint Gropp,Thomas Mosk,Steven Ongena,et al. DP15764 Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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