| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15773 |
| DP15773 The Unholy Trinity: Regulatory Forbearance, Stressed Banks and Zombie Firms | |
| Anusha Chari; Lakshita Jain; Nirupama Kulkarni | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-06 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | During the global financial crisis, the Reserve Bank of India enacted forbearance measures that lowered capital provisioning rates for loans under temporary liquidity stress. Matched bank-firm data reveal that troubled banks took advantage of the policy to also shield firms facing serious solvency issues. Perversely, in industries and bank portfolios with high proportions of failing firms, credit to healthy firms declined and was reallocated to the weakest firms. By incentivizing banks to hide true asset quality, the forbearance policy provided a license for regulatory arbitrage. The build-up of stressed assets in India’s predominantly state-owned banking system is consistent with accounting subterfuge. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Regulatory forbearance Non-performing assets Stressed banks Zombie lending |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15773 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544774 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anusha Chari,Lakshita Jain,Nirupama Kulkarni. DP15773 The Unholy Trinity: Regulatory Forbearance, Stressed Banks and Zombie Firms. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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