| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15781 |
| DP15781 Self-inflicted debt crises | |
| Theodosios Sakis Dimopoulos; Norman Schürhoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Optimal resolution of debt crises requires bailouts to account for borrowers' time-inconsistency. We show in a dynamic model of strategic default that myopic borrowers undervalue their option to default by a U-shaped error, which causes excessive leverage, imperfect consumption smoothing, underinvestment in normal times, and risk shifting in crisis times. Optimal bailouts either punish or reward myopia through smaller or larger transfers, leading to procrastinated default and protracted crises or the reverse, depending on whether financial transfers exacerbate or alleviate the borrowers' misperception of default risk. The model shows that borrowers and lenders ultimately self-inflict debt crises through their strategic interaction, myopic distress can be cheaper to resolve than rational distress, and myopia can benefit stakeholders. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Borrower myopia Time-inconsistency Strategic default Debt crisis Bailout fund Real options |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15781 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544781 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Theodosios Sakis Dimopoulos,Norman Schürhoff. DP15781 Self-inflicted debt crises. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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