| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15782 |
| DP15782 (In)efficient repo markets | |
| Tobias Dieler; Loriano Mancini; Norman Schürhoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common mechanisms, anonymous central-counterparty (CCP) and non-anonymous over-the-counter (OTC) markets, are inefficient and their welfare rankings depend on funding tightness. CCP (OTC) markets inefficiently liquidate high (low) quality assets for large (small) funding shocks. Two innovations to repo market design contribute to maximize welfare: a liquidity-contingent trading mechanism and a two-tiered guarantee fund. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Repo market Funding run Financial stability Asymmetric information Central clearing Novation Guarantee fund Collateral |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15782 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544782 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tobias Dieler,Loriano Mancini,Norman Schürhoff. DP15782 (In)efficient repo markets. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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