| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15792 |
| DP15792 Persuading Large Investors | |
| Ricardo Alonso; Konstantinos Zachariadis | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A regulator who designs a public stress test to elicit private investment in a distressed bank must account for large investors’ private information on the bank’s state. We provide conditions for crowding-in (crowding-out) so that the regulator offers more (less) information to better-informed investors. Crowding-in obtains if investors’ private information is not too discriminating of the state. We show that the region of the common prior is consequential: if crowding-in occurs for ex-ante optimistic investors then crowding-out follows if they were instead pessimistic. Investors’ value from more precise private signals may come from the effect on the public test’s precision. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information design Bayesian persuasion Stress tests Financial disclosure Endogenous public signal |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15792 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544793 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ricardo Alonso,Konstantinos Zachariadis. DP15792 Persuading Large Investors. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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