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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15792 |
DP15792 Persuading Large Investors | |
Ricardo Alonso; Konstantinos Zachariadis | |
发表日期 | 2021-02-10 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | A regulator who designs a public stress test to elicit private investment in a distressed bank must account for large investors’ private information on the bank’s state. We provide conditions for crowding-in (crowding-out) so that the regulator offers more (less) information to better-informed investors. Crowding-in obtains if investors’ private information is not too discriminating of the state. We show that the region of the common prior is consequential: if crowding-in occurs for ex-ante optimistic investors then crowding-out follows if they were instead pessimistic. Investors’ value from more precise private signals may come from the effect on the public test’s precision. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Information design Bayesian persuasion Stress tests Financial disclosure Endogenous public signal |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15792 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544793 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ricardo Alonso,Konstantinos Zachariadis. DP15792 Persuading Large Investors. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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