G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15792
DP15792 Persuading Large Investors
Ricardo Alonso; Konstantinos Zachariadis
发表日期2021-02-10
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要A regulator who designs a public stress test to elicit private investment in a distressed bank must account for large investors’ private information on the bank’s state. We provide conditions for crowding-in (crowding-out) so that the regulator offers more (less) information to better-informed investors. Crowding-in obtains if investors’ private information is not too discriminating of the state. We show that the region of the common prior is consequential: if crowding-in occurs for ex-ante optimistic investors then crowding-out follows if they were instead pessimistic. Investors’ value from more precise private signals may come from the effect on the public test’s precision.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词Information design Bayesian persuasion Stress tests Financial disclosure Endogenous public signal
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15792
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544793
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ricardo Alonso,Konstantinos Zachariadis. DP15792 Persuading Large Investors. 2021.
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