G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15809
DP15809 Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda
Konrad Burchardi; Jonathan de Quidt; Selim Gulesci; Benedetta Lerva; Stefano Tripodi
发表日期2021-02-12
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.
主题Development Economics
关键词Willingness to pay Becker-degroot-marschak Field experiment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15809
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544808
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Konrad Burchardi,Jonathan de Quidt,Selim Gulesci,et al. DP15809 Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda. 2021.
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