全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP15851 Tax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP15851
	DP15851 Tax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence
	John Guyton; Patrick Langetieg; Daniel Reck; Max Risch; Gabriel Zucman
发表日期	2021-02-26
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies tax evasion at the top of the U.S. income distribution using IRS micro-data from (i) random audits, (ii) targeted enforcement activities, and (iii) operational audits. Drawing on this unique combination of data, we demonstrate empirically that random audits underestimate tax evasion at the top of the income distribution. Specifically, random audits do not capture most tax evasion through offshore accounts and pass-through businesses, both of which are quantitatively important at the top. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, and we construct new estimates of the size and distribution of tax noncompliance in the United States. In our model, individuals can adopt a technology that would better conceal evasion at some fixed cost. Risk preferences and relatively high audit rates at the top drive the adoption of such sophisticated evasion technologies by high-income individuals. Consequently, random audits, which do not detect most sophisticated evasion, underestimate top tax evasion. After correcting for this bias, we find that unreported income as a fraction of true income rises from 7% in the bottom 50% to more than 20% in the top 1%, of which 6 percentage points correspond to undetected sophisticated evasion. Accounting for tax evasion increases the top 1% fiscal income share significantly.
主题	Public Economics
关键词	Tax evasion Inequality Tax gap
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp15851
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544844
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	John Guyton,Patrick Langetieg,Daniel Reck,et al. DP15851 Tax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence. 2021.