| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15855 |
| DP15855 Optimal Sequential Contests | |
| Toomas Hinnosaar | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contest design Oligopoly Public goods Rent-seeking R&d |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15855 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544848 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Toomas Hinnosaar. DP15855 Optimal Sequential Contests. 2021. |
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