G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15859
DP15859 Optimal Transport of Information
Semyon Malamud; Anna Cieslak; Paul Schrimpf
发表日期2021-02-28
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of an infinite signal space and characterize the solution in terms of a Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport problem with an endogenous information transport cost. We use our novel approach to: 1. Derive necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality based on Bregman divergences for non-convex functions. 2. Compute exact bounds for the Hausdorff dimension of the support of an optimal policy. 3. Derive a non-linear, second-order partial differential equation whose solutions correspond to regular optimal policies. We illustrate the power of our approach by providing explicit solutions to several non-linear, multidimensional Bayesian persuasion problems.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Bayesian persuasion Information design Signalling
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15859-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544852
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Semyon Malamud,Anna Cieslak,Paul Schrimpf. DP15859 Optimal Transport of Information. 2021.
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