| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15873 |
| DP15873 Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information | |
| Marcelo Fernandez; Kirill Rudov; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Deferred acceptance Incomplete information Matching |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15873 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544865 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcelo Fernandez,Kirill Rudov,Leeat Yariv. DP15873 Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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