| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15884 |
| DP15884 Contingent Contracts in Banking: Insurance or Risk Magnification? | |
| Hans Gersbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-04 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What happens when banks compete with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks? We show that the private sector insures the banking system efficiently against banking crises through such contracts when banks focus on expected profit maximization and failing banks go bankrupt. When risks are large, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors who receive state-contingent contracts. Repackaging of the risk among depositors can improve welfare. In contrast, when failing banks are rescued, new phenomena such as risk creation or magnification emerge, which would not occur with non-contingent contracts. In particular, depositors receive non-contingent contracts with comparatively high interest rates, while entrepreneurs obtain loan contracts that demand high repayment in good times and low repayment in bad times. As a result, banks overinvest and generate large macroeconomic risks, even if the underlying productivity risk is small or zero. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Financial intermediation - macroeconomics risks - state-contingent contracts - banking regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15884 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544876 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach. DP15884 Contingent Contracts in Banking: Insurance or Risk Magnification?. 2021. |
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