| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15891 |
| DP15891 Corruption under Austerity | |
| Daniele Gianmarco; Tommaso Giommoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-06 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how policies limiting the spending capacity of local governments may reduce corruption. We exploit the extension of one such policy, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), to small Italian municipalities. The DSP led to a decrease in both recorded corruption rates and corruption charges per euro spent. This effect emerges only in areas in which the DSP put a binding cap on municipal capital expenditures. The reduction in corruption is linked to accountability incentives as it emerges mostly in pre-electoral years and for re-eligible mayors. We then estimate the impact of the extension of the DSP on local public good provision in the following years, finding a null effect in the short run. Overall, our findings suggest that budget constraints might induce local governments to curb expenditures in a way that dampens their exposure to corruption without depressing local welfare. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Austerity Fiscal rules European funds Local public finance Public procurement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15891 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544882 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniele Gianmarco,Tommaso Giommoni. DP15891 Corruption under Austerity. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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