G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15903
DP15903 Contacts, Altruism and Competing Externalities
Flavio Toxvaerd
发表日期2021-03-11
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要This paper considers voluntary transmissive contacts between partially altruistic individuals in the presence of asymptomatic infection. Two different types of externalities from contacts are considered, infection externalities and socioeconomic externalities. When contacts are incidental, then externalities work through disease propagation. When contacts are essential, both infection and socioeconomic externalities are present. It is shown that for incidental contacts, equilibrium involves suboptimally high exposure whereas for essential contacts, equilibrium exposure is suboptimally low. An increase in altruism may thus increase or decrease disease transmission, depending on the type of contact under consideration. The analysis implies that policy to manage the epidemic should differentiate between different types of tranmissive activities.
主题Public Economics
关键词Epidemics altruism Infection externalities Socioeconomic externalities Disease control
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15903
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544895
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Flavio Toxvaerd. DP15903 Contacts, Altruism and Competing Externalities. 2021.
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