| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15903 |
| DP15903 Contacts, Altruism and Competing Externalities | |
| Flavio Toxvaerd | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-11 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers voluntary transmissive contacts between partially altruistic individuals in the presence of asymptomatic infection. Two different types of externalities from contacts are considered, infection externalities and socioeconomic externalities. When contacts are incidental, then externalities work through disease propagation. When contacts are essential, both infection and socioeconomic externalities are present. It is shown that for incidental contacts, equilibrium involves suboptimally high exposure whereas for essential contacts, equilibrium exposure is suboptimally low. An increase in altruism may thus increase or decrease disease transmission, depending on the type of contact under consideration. The analysis implies that policy to manage the epidemic should differentiate between different types of tranmissive activities. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Epidemics altruism Infection externalities Socioeconomic externalities Disease control |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15903 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544895 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Flavio Toxvaerd. DP15903 Contacts, Altruism and Competing Externalities. 2021. |
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