| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15929 |
| DP15929 The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance: | |
| Luca Bellodi; Massimo Morelli; Matia Vannoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-16 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the consequences of populism on bureaucratic expertise and government performance. We use novel data on about 8,000 municipalities in Italy, over a period of 20 years, and we estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor with a close-election regression discontinuity design. We find that the election of a populist mayor leads to (1) higher turnover among top bureaucrats; (2) an increase in the probability of replacing expert with non-expert bureaucrats; (3) a decrease in the percentage of highly educated bureaucrats; (4) and lower performance overall. Moreover, we find evidence that the increased inefficiency of the bureaucracy is accompanied by proliferation of council and executive resolutions, in line with the recent literature on overproduction of laws and bureaucratic inefficiency. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bureaucracy Turnover Populist politicians Government performance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15929 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544920 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luca Bellodi,Massimo Morelli,Matia Vannoni. DP15929 The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance:. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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