| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15940 |
| DP15940 Public debt and the political economy of reforms | |
| Pierre C Boyer; Christoph Esslinger; Brian Roberson | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and choose the amount of public debt. Politicians also allocate pork-barrel spending to voters in each period. We show that allowing politicians to raise debt ensures that the reform is always implemented when the reform's ratio of private good to public good gains exceeds a threshold, i.e. the reform generates enough private good benefits. This is not the case when the reform's ratio of private good to public good gains is below this threshold. We also examine hard and a soft debt limits, and find that both limits reduce the political success of the reform. However, at moderate debt levels soft limits dominate hard limits with respect to equilibrium efficiency of reform provision. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political competition Public debt Reforms Redistributive politics Debt and spending limits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15940 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544931 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre C Boyer,Christoph Esslinger,Brian Roberson. DP15940 Public debt and the political economy of reforms. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
