G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16003
DP16003 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information
Patrick W. Schmitz
发表日期2021-04-03
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the investment technologies. Yet, this result has been derived under the assumption of symmetric information. We show that technology matters when the negotiations over the provision of the public good take place under asymmetric information. If party A has a better investment technology, ownership by party A can be optimal even when party B has a larger expected valuation of the public good.
主题Organizational Economics
关键词Incomplete contracts Control rights Public goods Private information Investment incentives
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16003
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544987
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Patrick W. Schmitz. DP16003 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information. 2021.
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