| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16003 |
| DP16003 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the investment technologies. Yet, this result has been derived under the assumption of symmetric information. We show that technology matters when the negotiations over the provision of the public good take place under asymmetric information. If party A has a better investment technology, ownership by party A can be optimal even when party B has a larger expected valuation of the public good. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Control rights Public goods Private information Investment incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16003 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544987 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP16003 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information. 2021. |
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