G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16012
DP16012 Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment.
Alessandra Casella; Jeffrey Guo; Michelle Jiang
发表日期2021-04-06
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.
主题Public Economics
关键词Voting Turnout Minority protection Laboratory experiments Costly voting
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16012
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544995
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alessandra Casella,Jeffrey Guo,Michelle Jiang. DP16012 Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment.. 2021.
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