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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP16012 |
DP16012 Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment. | |
Alessandra Casella; Jeffrey Guo; Michelle Jiang | |
发表日期 | 2021-04-06 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Voting Turnout Minority protection Laboratory experiments Costly voting |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16012 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544995 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Jeffrey Guo,Michelle Jiang. DP16012 Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment.. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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