| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16025 |
| DP16025 Co-opetition and Disruption With Public Ownership | |
| Arnoud Boot; Vladimir Vladimirov | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do mandatory disclosure requirements make public firms less disruptive and competitive? Not necessarily. We offer a new perspective showing that mandatory disclosure facilitates "co-opetition" --- a strategy of competing on some dimensions while avoiding competition on others. Co-opetition encourages disruption by making firms more profitable and lowering financing costs. However, it may undermine commitment to intermediately attractive investments, making the benefit of being public U-shaped in investment attractiveness. We provide evidence supporting the model's predictions. We show that the enactment of stricter mandatory disclosure requirements leads to higher markups and, simultaneously, to a U-shaped increase in innovation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Competition Cooperation Co-opetition Public and private ownership Disruption Innovation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16025-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545007 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Arnoud Boot,Vladimir Vladimirov. DP16025 Co-opetition and Disruption With Public Ownership. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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