| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16037 |
| DP16037 Using Re-election Thresholds to Curb Political Polarization | |
| Hans Gersbach; Philippe Muller; Oriol Tejada | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-14 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how tightening reelection hurdles for incumbents can curb political polarization and increase welfare. We use a two-period model in which a politician is elected for office in the first period and enacts a new policy. In the second period, elections take place between the incumbent and a challenger, and the winning candidate chooses the extent to which the first-period policy is reformed. Reforming a policy is costly, and such costs increase with the policy shift and are borne by parties and voters. We show that raising the vote-share needed for re-election above one half reduces policy polarization and increases welfare. Moreover, the latter measures depend on the re-election threshold in a non-monotonic way and a particular (intermediate) threshold simultaneously minimizes policy polarization and maximizes welfare. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Political polarization Costs of change Re-election hurdles |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16037 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545017 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Philippe Muller,Oriol Tejada. DP16037 Using Re-election Thresholds to Curb Political Polarization. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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