| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16038 |
| DP16038 Colluding Against Environmental Regulation | |
| Mathias Reynaert; Jorge Alé-Chilet; Cuicui Chen; Jing Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-14 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study collusion among firms under imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. We develop a model in which firms increase variable profits by shading pollution and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by shading jointly. We apply our model to a case with three German automakers colluding to reduce the size of diesel exhaust fluid (DEF) tanks, an emission control technology used to comply with air pollution standards. To estimate our model, we use data from the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018. We find that jointly choosing small DEF tanks lowers the expected noncompliance penalties by at least 188-976 million euros. Smaller DEF tanks improve buyer and producer surplus by freeing up valuable trunk space and saving production costs, but they create more pollution damages. Collusion reduces social welfare by 0.78-4.44 billion euros. Environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in protecting society from collusion against regulation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16038-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545018 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mathias Reynaert,Jorge Alé-Chilet,Cuicui Chen,et al. DP16038 Colluding Against Environmental Regulation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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