| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16039 |
| DP16039 Incentivizing Negative Emissions Through Carbon Shares | |
| Derek Lemoine | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-14 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I show that commonly proposed emission taxes are not optimal for controlling climate change: they can achieve zero emissions but cannot induce negative emissions. The first-best policy charges firms period by period for leaving a stock of carbon in the atmosphere, not just for injecting carbon into the atmosphere. I propose a feasible version of this policy that requires emitters to post an upfront bond that finances a transferable asset (a "carbon share"). The regulator reduces this asset's face value as damages accumulate and pays out the asset's remaining face value once its holder removes the underlying unit of carbon from the atmosphere. I show that the optimal bond is equal to the worst-case social cost of carbon, with the carbon share paying a dividend as long as the worst-case is not realized. Quantitatively, a bond that is double the optimal emission tax is sufficient to provide optimal carbon removal incentives in 95% of cases. |
| 主题 | Research policy networks ; Climate Change |
| 关键词 | Carbon climate Externality Emission tax Pigouvian tax Air capture |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16039 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545019 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Derek Lemoine. DP16039 Incentivizing Negative Emissions Through Carbon Shares. 2021. |
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