| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16052 |
| DP16052 Aversion to breaking rules and migration | |
| Massimo Anelli; Tommaso Colussi; Andrea Ichino | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-18 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Migration movements may increase the geographic dispersion of the Aversion to Breaking Rules (ABR) in a population, with possible long-term economic consequences. We show this result with Italian Census data, using indicators of false birth date registrations for families of South-North migrants and remainers in the two macro-regions. Within locality$\times$biennium cells, deterrence and cheating benefits are similar in the two groups and thus cheating differences are informative about the underlying ABR, as our theory suggests. We also exploit the Fascist reforms of 1926 as shocks to deterrence, offering additional information on the underlying ABR of migrant and remainer families. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Migration aversion to breaking rules Italy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16052 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545031 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Anelli,Tommaso Colussi,Andrea Ichino. DP16052 Aversion to breaking rules and migration. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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