| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16100 |
| DP16100 The Perils of Friendly Oversight | |
| Dino Gerardi; Ignacio Monzon; Edoardo Grillo | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In democratic societies, politicians craft reform proposals which are then subject to the scrutiny of external authorities. Politicians want their proposals approved and can work to improve their quality. Authorities have their own agendas: they may be in favor or against the reforms under their scrutiny. We study how the authority’s agenda affects the likelihood that a reform is approved and its quality. We show that an authority in favor of a reform can be detrimental towards its approval. This happens when it is easy to incentivize the politician’s work and the status quo alternative is not too attractive. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Information transmission Moral hazard Oversight Persuasion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16100 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545077 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dino Gerardi,Ignacio Monzon,Edoardo Grillo. DP16100 The Perils of Friendly Oversight. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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