全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP16116 THE STATE CAPACITY CEILING ON TAX RATES: EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMIZED TAX ABATEMENTS IN THE DRC

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP16116
	DP16116 THE STATE CAPACITY CEILING ON TAX RATES: EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMIZED TAX ABATEMENTS IN THE DRC
	Augustin Bergeron; Gabriel Tourek; Jonathan Weigel
发表日期	2021-05-06
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	How can developing countries increase the tax revenue they collect? In collaboration with the Provincial Government of Kasaï-Central, we study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to different property tax liabilities. We find that status quo tax rates are above the revenue-maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing the property tax rate by approximately 34% would maximize government revenue, by increasing tax compliance. We then investigate how responses to tax rates interact with enforcement. We exploit two sources of variation in enforcement — randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors — and show that the RMTR increases with enforcement. Replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity by average collectors would raise the RMTR by 42%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. While a naive government that sequentially implements the RMTR and increases enforcement would raise revenue by 61%, a sophisticated government that prospectively implements the post-enforcement RMTR would instead raise revenue by 77%. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue-maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, and thereby demonstrates the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with tax enforcement to expand fiscal capacity.
主题	Development Economics ; Public Economics
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp16116
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545093
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Augustin Bergeron,Gabriel Tourek,Jonathan Weigel. DP16116 THE STATE CAPACITY CEILING ON TAX RATES: EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMIZED TAX ABATEMENTS IN THE DRC. 2021.