| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16151
|
| DP16151 The "kill zone": Copying, acquisition and start-ups' direction of innovation |
| Sandro Shelegia; Massimo Motta
|
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-13
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | An incumbent monopolist may prevent a firm which currently sells a complementary product from developing a substitute, by copying its product. Imitation reduces the potential rival's current profits, making it less likely for it to obtain funding in the financial market.
The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behaviour may also create an "ex ante" effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a substitute (that is, not to enter the "kill zone") and develop another complement instead. Further, in this case the incumbent will have an incentive not to copy, since a new complement will raise its rents.
The possibility of being acquired by the incumbent tends to push the rival towards developing a substitute rather than a complement. By choosing the former, potential gains from the acquisition are created (in the form of suppression of competition): as long as the rival has some bargaining power in the determination of the takeover price, it will then benefit from entering the "kill zone". |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Innovation
Copying
Platforms
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16151-0
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545124
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Sandro Shelegia,Massimo Motta. DP16151 The "kill zone": Copying, acquisition and start-ups' direction of innovation. 2021.
|
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