| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16160
|
| DP16160 Dynamic Choice and Common Learning |
| Rahul Deb; Ludovic Renou
|
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-16
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the time-varying state from the same information and their actions change because of the evolving common belief. The researcher does not observe agents' preferences, the prior, the common information and the stochastic process for the state. We characterize the set of choices that are rationalized by this model and generalize the information environments to allow for private information. We discuss the implications of our results for uncovering discrimination and committee decision making. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16160
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545133
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Rahul Deb,Ludovic Renou. DP16160 Dynamic Choice and Common Learning. 2021.
|
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