| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16177 |
| DP16177 Contracting in Peer Networks | |
| Ron Kaniel; Peter DeMarzo | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-21 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider multi-agent multi-firm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to their peers’, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first-best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16177 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545149 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ron Kaniel,Peter DeMarzo. DP16177 Contracting in Peer Networks. 2021. |
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