| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16179 |
| DP16179 Insider Trading Regulation and Market Quality Tradeoffs | |
| Antonio Mele; Francesco Sangiorgi | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-21 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Insider trading should not be left unregulated: it should be either subject to mandatory disclosure or banned altogether. As the costs to collect and process information drop, investors render markets increasingly efficient. Insider trading would hinder this process by discouraging such activities: prohibiting it would avoid information crowding-out and make markets more efficient. When information costs are large, or uncertainty is small, such that information activities are limited to start with, these effects are small and regulating insider trading through mandatory disclosure leads to the informationally most efficient market. In times of elevated uncertainty, post-trade regulation of insider trading also acts as policy complement to ex ante corporate disclosure for the purpose of increasing market efficiency. Finally, markets are always the most liquid with a complete ban on insider trading. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Insider trading Post-trade transparency Ex ante corporate disclosure Information crowding-out |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16179 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545151 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio Mele,Francesco Sangiorgi. DP16179 Insider Trading Regulation and Market Quality Tradeoffs. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
