| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16192 |
| DP16192 Financing and Resolving Banking Groups | |
| Albert Banal-Estanol; Julian Kolm; Gyöngyi Lóránth | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-26 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how bank resolution regimes affect investment. Banking groups create financing synergies by transferring excess financing capacity across units and lowering bankers' agency rents. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution mutualizes losses, which permits ex-post efficient continuation of weaker units following negative shocks, but can prevent optimal investment ex-ante. Multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution does not mutualize losses, which forces weaker units to shut down following negative shocks, but can foster ex-ante investment. MPOE resolution is more efficient when stronger units' financial excess capacity is small, weak units' financing deficits are large, and units' synergies are low or units face different risks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Complex banking groups Resolution regimes Restructuring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16192 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545163 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Albert Banal-Estanol,Julian Kolm,Gyöngyi Lóránth. DP16192 Financing and Resolving Banking Groups. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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