G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16192
DP16192 Financing and Resolving Banking Groups
Albert Banal-Estanol; Julian Kolm; Gyöngyi Lóránth
发表日期2021-05-26
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study how bank resolution regimes affect investment. Banking groups create financing synergies by transferring excess financing capacity across units and lowering bankers' agency rents. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution mutualizes losses, which permits ex-post efficient continuation of weaker units following negative shocks, but can prevent optimal investment ex-ante. Multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution does not mutualize losses, which forces weaker units to shut down following negative shocks, but can foster ex-ante investment. MPOE resolution is more efficient when stronger units' financial excess capacity is small, weak units' financing deficits are large, and units' synergies are low or units face different risks.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Complex banking groups Resolution regimes Restructuring
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16192
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545163
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Albert Banal-Estanol,Julian Kolm,Gyöngyi Lóránth. DP16192 Financing and Resolving Banking Groups. 2021.
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