| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16206 |
| DP16206 Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness | |
| Anne-Katrin Roesler; Rahul Deb | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-31 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller’s optimal mechanism in two different information environments. We begin by deriving the buyer-optimal outcome. Here, an information designer first selects a signal, and then the seller chooses an optimal mechanism in response; the designer’s objective is to maximize consumer surplus. Then, we derive the optimal informationally robust mechanism. In this case, the seller first chooses the mechanism, and then nature picks the signal that minimizes the seller’s profits. We derive the relation between both problems and show that the optimal mechanism in both cases takes the form of pure bundling. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16206 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545177 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anne-Katrin Roesler,Rahul Deb. DP16206 Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness. 2021. |
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