| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16211 |
| DP16211 Fiscal Rules and Discretion with Risk of Default | |
| Chiara Felli; Facundo Piguillem; Liyan Shi | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is widely believed that governments tend to overaccumulate debt, which gives rise to the need for fiscal rules. This paper studies the optimal fiscal and default rules when governments can default on their debt obligations. We build a continuous-time model that encompasses the standard rationale for debt overaccumulation: hyperbolic discounting and political economy frictions. In addition, governments are subject to taste shocks, which makes spending optimally random. Since shocks are private information, there is a trade-off between rules and discretion. We derive the optimal fiscal rules which are debt-dependent only when default is possible. Depending on the severity of the spending bias and the cost of default, the optimal fiscal rules range from strict debt limits, complemented by strong deficit limits, to the absence of all rules. In intermediate cases, debt-dependent deficit limits must be complemented with default rules, with some areas where default is banned and others where default is mandatory. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Spending bias Fiscal rules Government debt Sovereign default |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16211-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545181 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chiara Felli,Facundo Piguillem,Liyan Shi. DP16211 Fiscal Rules and Discretion with Risk of Default. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
