G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16213
DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee
Michael Ehrmann; Robin Tietz; Bauke Visser
发表日期2021-06-02
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change behavior? We find that the data go against the hypothesis that without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting interventions to compensate for the loss of formal influence; rather, they support the hypothesis that the voting right makes presidents more involved. We also find that speeches move financial markets less in years that presidents vote. We argue that these discounts are consistent with their communication behavior.
主题Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词Voting right rotation Monetary policy committee Central bank communication Fomc Financial market response
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16213
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545183
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael Ehrmann,Robin Tietz,Bauke Visser. DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee. 2021.
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