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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP16213 |
DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee | |
Michael Ehrmann; Robin Tietz; Bauke Visser | |
发表日期 | 2021-06-02 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change behavior? We find that the data go against the hypothesis that without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting interventions to compensate for the loss of formal influence; rather, they support the hypothesis that the voting right makes presidents more involved. We also find that speeches move financial markets less in years that presidents vote. We argue that these discounts are consistent with their communication behavior. |
主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
关键词 | Voting right rotation Monetary policy committee Central bank communication Fomc Financial market response |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16213 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545183 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ehrmann,Robin Tietz,Bauke Visser. DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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