全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP16213
	DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee
	Michael Ehrmann; Robin Tietz; Bauke Visser
发表日期	2021-06-02
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change behavior? We find that the data go against the hypothesis that without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting interventions to compensate for the loss of formal influence; rather, they support the hypothesis that the voting right makes presidents more involved. We also find that speeches move financial markets less in years that presidents vote. We argue that these discounts are consistent with their communication behavior.
主题	Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词	Voting right rotation Monetary policy committee Central bank communication Fomc Financial market response
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp16213
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545183
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Michael Ehrmann,Robin Tietz,Bauke Visser. DP16213 Voting right rotation, behavior of committee members and financial market reactions: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee. 2021.