| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16228 |
| DP16228 Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models | |
| Alfred Galichon; Bernard Salanie | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-07 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility and general unobserved heterogeneity. Under a separability assumption that generalizes Choo and Siow (2006), we first show that the equilibrium matching maximizes a social gain function that trades off exploiting complementarities in observable characteristics and matching on unobserved characteristics. We use this result to derive simple closed-form formulae that identify the joint matching surplus and the equilibrium utilities of all participants, given any known distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. We provide efficient algorithms to compute the stable matching and to estimate parametric versions of the model. Finally, we revisit Choo and Siow’s empirical application to illustrate the potential of our more general approach. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Matching Marriage Assignment Hedonic prices |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16228 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545196 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alfred Galichon,Bernard Salanie. DP16228 Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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