| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16231 |
| DP16231 Attention Oligopoly | |
| Andrea Prat; Tommaso Valletti | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model digital platforms as attention brokers that have proprietary information about their users' product preference and sell targeted ad space to retail product industries. Retail producers - incumbents or entrants - compete for access to this attention bottleneck. We discuss when increased concentration among attention brokers results in a tightening of the attention bottleneck, leading to higher ad prices, fewer ads being sold to entrants, and lower consumer welfare in the product industries. The welfare effect is characterized in terms of patterns of individual usage across platforms. A merger assessment that relies on aggregate platform usage alone can be highly biased. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Digital platforms Mergers Targeted advertising |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16231 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545199 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Prat,Tommaso Valletti. DP16231 Attention Oligopoly. 2021. |
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