G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16235
DP16235 Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities
Johannes Münster; Markus Reisinger
发表日期2021-06-09
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要In bilateral negotiations between a principal and two agents, we show that the agents' bargaining strengths are crucial for the determination of the bargaining sequence and the efficiency of decisions. In a general framework with externalities between agents, we find that the surplus is highest if the principal negotiates with the stronger agent first, regardless of externalities being positive or negative. The principal chooses the efficient sequence with negative externalities, but often prefers the inefficient sequence with positive externalities. We show that our results extend to a general number of agents and provide conditions for simultaneous negotiations to be optimal.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Bargaining power Sequential negotiations Externalities Bilateral contracting Endogenous timing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16235
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545203
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Johannes Münster,Markus Reisinger. DP16235 Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities. 2021.
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