| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16235 |
| DP16235 Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities | |
| Johannes Münster; Markus Reisinger | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-09 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In bilateral negotiations between a principal and two agents, we show that the agents' bargaining strengths are crucial for the determination of the bargaining sequence and the efficiency of decisions. In a general framework with externalities between agents, we find that the surplus is highest if the principal negotiates with the stronger agent first, regardless of externalities being positive or negative. The principal chooses the efficient sequence with negative externalities, but often prefers the inefficient sequence with positive externalities. We show that our results extend to a general number of agents and provide conditions for simultaneous negotiations to be optimal. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining power Sequential negotiations Externalities Bilateral contracting Endogenous timing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16235 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johannes Münster,Markus Reisinger. DP16235 Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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