G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16238
DP16238 Coinsurance vs. copayments: reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers
Helmuth Cremer; Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
发表日期2021-06-09
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals differ in their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes: one in which insurers use coinsurance rates (ad valorem reimbursements) and one in which insurers use copayments (specific reimbursements). We show that the induced equilibrium with copayments involves a lower producer price and a higher level of welfare for consumers. This results provides strong support for a reference price based reimbursement policy.
主题Public Economics
关键词Ex post moral hazard Health insurance competition Copayments Imperfect competition
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16238
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545206
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Helmuth Cremer,Jean-Marie Lozachmeur. DP16238 Coinsurance vs. copayments: reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers. 2021.
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